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Abstract 
In this paper, I analyse optimal access charges for the provision of telecommunication network, mobile commerce, and cloud 
services. Using theoretical analysis, I investigate when a regulator can set rational access pricing, considering the characteristics 
of access demand. I demonstrate that optimal access prices depend on whether the final products or services are strategic 
independence or strategic substitutes. The results have implications for policy makers setting optimal access charges that 
maximise social welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
Previous studies on the problem of access it pricing focus on the peak-load pricing for homogenous goods. Under 
regulations, a new entrant’s network access demands may lead to a reduction in an incumbent’s profits because an 
incumbent may not provide its goods or services without fully using its own network facilities, and so must allow 
new competitors who provide the same product or services to use up any excess. Whereas an entrant’s access 
demands for differentiated goods at off-peak times can be desirable for the incumbents as it utilises excess facilities, 
without directly competing for the same markets. In the smart phone era, demands for network services continue to 
increase, due to consumer demand for various services including mobile internet access, data services, etc.  
Some studies assume that the incumbent access provider is a Stackelberg leader in pricing or production 
decisions (Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers, 1996; Armstrong and Vickers, 1998; Laffont and Tirole, 2000). Recent 
regulatory trends show that an incumbent is obliged to provide that own bottleneck facilities to entrants (Joo, Ku and 
Kim, 2001). Thus, it is reasonable to assume the entrant rather than the incumbent has the leading role. Using the 
regulatory framework, I investigate optimal access pricing, taking into account the characteristics of final products 
or services during off-peak time, and compare with the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) or marginal cost 
pricing.  
I proceed as follows: In section two, I outline the basic model, in section three, I illustrate the optimal access 
pricing and its implications, and in the final section, I summarise this research. 
2. The Model 
Suppose new entrants to the market, such as smart phone application service providers, mobile banking 
companies and other mobile commerce merchants using the incumbent’s telecommunication network, enter a 
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market where the incumbent has been the only supplier (a monopoly). The entrant needs to lease the incumbent's 
facilities to produce the final product. According to the regulations, assuming that one unit of production for the 
final product requires the use of one unit of the facilities; the incumbent is obliged to supply the entrant, access to its 
facilities regardless of the amounts. The entrant pays an access price a, for leasing the facilities, and the final 
products of both firms can be heterogeneous. 
In this paper, I refer to the model considered by Joo, et al., (2001) and a situation where there is excess network 
capacity, and where the incumbent’s network is not directly affected by the demands of the entrant. The incumbent 
uses iq units of the facilities, supplying the same amount of the final product where superscript i  denotes the 
incumbent. The entrant chooses its production level, eq , where superscript e  represents the entrant, and then 
requests access to the facilities. eaq  is the total access expenditure.  
The total production is ei qqq += . It is worth noting that the entrant behaves as a Stackelberg leader in this 
access game. Let ),( eii qqC be the incumbent's cost when it produces iq  units of the final product and supplies 
eq units of the access input to the entrant. The entrant has to spend )( ee qC to produce eq  units of the final 
product in addition to the access cost eaq . Define i
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∂≡1  is the entrant's marginal cost of supplying the final product, where .2
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function is given by )(qPP =  where P  is the final product price and 0<
∂
∂≡′
q
PP . The timing of the game is 
as follows: (1) the regulator chooses an access charge schedule a ; (2) given a , the entrant chooses the quantity 
eq ; (3) the incumbent observes eq and then chooses iq . 
Then, we give the incumbent's profit by: 
               ),(),();( eiieieiieii qqCaqqqqPqq −+=Π .      
We give its reaction function by the following first order condition:  
0=−+
′ iiii CPqP .                           (1) 
Let )( ei qq represent the reaction of the incumbent to entry. Knowing the incumbent’s capacity decision, the 
entrant determines its profit maximising output level by solving the following problem under given a. Thus, we give 
the problem of the entrant’s profit maximising by:  
                  )(),(),;(max eeeeieeiee
q
qCaqqqqPaqq
e
−−=Π .          
The first-order condition is:  
01 =−−+
′ eeee CaPqP .                (2) 
Let )(aqe  be the solution to (2). 
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Optimal access pricing and its Implications 
Suppose that the regulator intervenes in the determination of the access charge to maximise social welfare. The 
Stackelberg framework permits the regulator to control the firm’s output indirectly by setting the access price. After 
observing the behaviour of the incumbent and the entrant, the regulator sets the optimal access price that maximises 
social welfare with W  defined as the un-weighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. We calculate the regulator's 
problem by: 
))(())((()()()(max
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0
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Rearranging, we have: 
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.                 (3) 
Let *a , *iq  and *eq  be the solutions to this regulatory problem. There are two types of optimal access price 
according to the product characteristics represented by the measure of substitutability. 
1.1. Strategic independence case 
Firstly, I analyse when a final product is strategic independence. Players' strategies are said to be strategic 
independence if the best-response functions are independent of other players' actions (Shy, 1995). If 0=
∂
∂
e
i
q
q
, the 
incumbent's strategic response is determined irrespective of the entrants’ action, the access price will be given by 
***
2
* eei
ind qPCa
′
+=  
Proposition 1. When a final product is strategic independence, the optimal access charge can be less than 
marginal cost. 
 
Proposition 1 says that to maximise social welfare, the access charge can be lower than marginal cost. If a 
regulatory regime cannot support this access charge, the incumbent can set the access charge with marginal cost 
pricing. Optimal access pricing under strategic independence can be classified into three types depending on the 
extent of constraint of the excess capacity and *eq . Figure one shows three types of access pricing schemes, (i) 
unregulated case, (ii) marginal cost pricing and (iii) below marginal cost pricing. In the unregulated case, the access 
charge will be higher marginal cost.  
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Figure 1. Optimal access pricing under strategic independence 
3.2 Strategic substitute case 
Next, I analyse when a final product is a strategic substitute. One can say that players' strategies are strategic 
substitutes if the best-response functions are downward sloping (Shy, 1995). Using the optimal behaviour of the 
incumbent, e
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 is drawn by differentiating (1) as follows: 
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access charge in the strategic substitute case is given by: 
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where sub denotes a strategic substitute case. 
When the final product is a complete strategic substitute (CSS) and 1−=
∂
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e
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, the optimal access charge is 
given by:  
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where css denotes a complete substitute case. 
 
Proposition 2. When a final product is a strategic substitute, the optimal access charge is less than ECPR. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that when a final product is a strategic substitute, for maximising social welfare,  the 
regulatory regime can set the optimal access charge below ECPR, which is )( 1
*
2
iii CPC −+ . This means that 
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when a final product is a strategic substitute, the access price can be higher than marginal cost. This result highlights 
some interesting findings related to access charge schemes. Firstly, when the final product is a complete substitute, 
the access charge is the highest, but it is still less than ECPR under regulation. Secondly, if the marginal costs of 
producing the final product and supplying the access service are the same ( ii CC 12 = ), then the access price is less 
than the price of the final product. And thirdly, when a regulator sets the optimal access charge less marginal cost, 
the incumbent sets the final product with marginal cost pricing ( ii CP 1= ) and then, access charges in both the 
strategic substitute case and strategic independence case are the same ( ****2
*
ind
eei
sub aqPCa =
′
+= ) . Therefore, 
the regulator can have different subsidy plans for access charges for social welfare depending on the measure of 
strategic substitutability of the final products. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigated optimal access charges, where there is an excess of the incumbent’s 
telecommunication network facilities and when the final products or services are heterogeneous, according to a new 
entrant’s demands. The optimal access charge can be less than marginal cost when a final product is strategic 
independence while the optimal access charge is less than ECPR when a final product is a strategic substitute. For 
the future research some empirical studies on access pricing for cloud services or mobile commerce providers can be 
carried out to support results. 
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